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INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE 
Amici are professors of law, business, economics, 
and sports management. (A list of signatories is 
included in the Appendix.) Their sole interest in this 
case is to ensure that antitrust law develops in a way 
that serves the public interest by promoting 
competition.1 
Amici are numerous and diverse, differ in our 
legal and political views, and disagree about some 
details of this litigation. But we are united in our 
agreement on three primary points. First, 
Petitioners seek to unwind a century of antitrust law 
by obtaining immunity for anticompetitive conduct. 
Second, Petitioners mischaracterize numerous 
rulings, most notably this Court’s opinion in NCAA 
v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 
468 U.S. 85 (1984). And third, Petitioners aim to 
overturn a hornbook Rule-of-Reason analysis by 
which the lower courts corrected the NCAA’s own 
failure to offer antitrust justifications. 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF 
ARGUMENT 
1. Petitioners argue that Board of Regents 
excused the NCAA from evidentiary obligations 
strongly presumed to govern all matters under 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. They claim this Court 
gave the NCAA an antitrust immunity enjoyed by no 
other entity in American law, a sui generis power to 
 
1 No person other than amici curiae or their counsel authored 
this brief in whole or in part or made a monetary contribution 
intended to fund its preparation or submission. The parties 
have filed blanket consents to the filing of amicus briefs. 
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decide that values other than price, quality, and 
output can justify its trade restraints. And they 
assert that this Court did all that despite its 
insistence throughout antitrust history that 
markets—not committees of competitors—decide 
which products succeed and fail, and despite its own 
deep hostility to scope limits and social-value 
defenses. 
2. Petitioners build that argument almost 
entirely out of a few pages of dicta in Board of 
Regents, presented in sometimes misleading ways. 
They cite Board of Regents—a case the NCAA lost—
145 times on 61 pages, take dicta out of context, 
selectively edit quotations, and disregard that 
decision’s setting. They also misrepresent lower 
court decisions and fail to report that one of them 
draws the same line between procompetitive and 
anticompetitive restraints as did the lower courts in 
this case. At most, only one case in their purported 
“judicial consensus” comes close to holding what 
they say. 
3. Petitioners recognize that if their proffered 
immunity is rejected, they must defend their 
restraint with actual evidence. But their evidentiary 
demonstration fared poorly below, so they 
mischaracterize the Rule of Reason and its 
application in this case. We mostly ignore their 
review of facts and remedial details, and we believe 
this Court should too. See Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 
at 98 n.15 (noting the “great weight” attached to 
facts found by both lower courts); Brief for the 
United States, Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, at 34 
(view of President Reagan’s Solicitor General that 
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“there is no reason for this Court to overturn the 
factual findings on which the two lower courts 
agree”). 
Instead, we argue the following: Petitioners’ 
failure at the first stage of the Rule of Reason was 
substantial and undisputed. Plaintiffs demonstrated 
“severe” anticompetitive effects, as “the challenged 
restraints suppress competition and fix the price of 
student-athletes’ services.” Pet. App. 139a.2 
Petitioners’ showing at the second stage was also 
very weak. They largely rested on their definition of 
“amateurism” without showing benefits to price, 
quality, or output. The evidence they offered of 
legally relevant gains was found by the courts to be 
slim. Moreover, they succeeded at all only because 
the courts worked to help them, looking for evidence 
within their presentation on “amateurism” that 
could be understood in legally cognizable terms of 
consumer demand. It is thus ironic that they now 
blame the courts for “judicial micromanagement,” 
“central plann[ing],” and “endless litigation.” The 
courts merely made an effort to find legally relevant 
benefits within an otherwise weak evidentiary 
showing. 
Petitioners respond to that substantial showing 
of net anticompetitive harm with logical critiques of 
the lower courts’ handling of the second and third 
stages. They claim that the courts should have 
considered the NCAA’s justification as one package 
rather than individual justifications, and that the 
failure to do so led to a “least restrictive alternative” 
 
2 Citations to “Pet. App.” are to the Appendix in No. 20-512. 
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requirement. A review of the 897 Rule-of-Reason 
cases in the modern era, however, finds no support 
for this position in the caselaw. We also explain that 
the “less restrictive alternative” formulation used 
below was the most demanding standard imposed on 
plaintiffs by any court in the past four decades. In 
any event, Petitioners’ critiques of the lower courts’ 
analyses at the second and third stages are beside 
the point. Even if plaintiffs had not shown a 
competitively preferred alternative, the case would 
have proceeded to the fourth stage—balancing— 
and under the lopsided evidence of net competitive 
injury below, the plaintiffs most likely would have 
won. 
Once the trial court appropriately found an 
unreasonable restraint, it was faced with a choice of 
remedy. It could either ban the conduct outright, 
which would be even worse from Petitioners’ 
perspective, or enter some sort of conduct remedy. It 
is no court’s fault that finding limits short of an 
outright ban entails factual judgments linked to the 
harm and benefits the parties could show. 
Petitioners’ critique of the injunction’s details 
effectively relitigates fact-finding that was, at worst, 
a necessary evil to rectify their own conduct and 
sparse evidentiary showing. The courts below were 
clear that the NCAA can design its product any way 
it likes, except that if it horizontally fixes the price 
of an input—conduct that in other sectors could send 
people to prison—it should respect certain limits, 
and should expect to defend them from time to time 
with evidence of legally relevant benefits. 
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4. Because Petitioners advance no other basis 
for reversal, and the law was otherwise applied 
properly below, we urge affirmance. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PETITIONERS’ ARGUMENTS WOULD 
UNDERMINE COMPETITION AND 
CONFLICT WITH ANTITRUST LAW 
The substance of the new rule Petitioners ask 
this Court to create would sharply conflict with 
established antitrust policy. It would be a new 
immunity or scope limitation of a kind this Court 
has long opposed. It would also empower the NCAA, 
alone among antitrust defendants, to choose values 
of its own liking—not price, quality or output—and 
use them to excuse conduct that would otherwise be 
illegal. As a corollary, the NCAA would enjoy a 
unique authority to preserve a product in a 
particular form, even one at odds with consumer 
preference expressed through free markets. 
Relatedly, the NCAA would gain a special, favorable 
antitrust treatment available to none of the 
thousands of other desirable and important 
economic integrations throughout the economy. Nor, 
finally, do Petitioners gain any special advantage by 
calling the NCAA a “joint venture.” 
A. Petitioners’ Rule Would Limit 
Antitrust Scope in a Way Deeply 
Disfavored by This Court 
Though they characterize it in various ways, 
Petitioners seek what is effectively a new judicial 
immunity. They mostly argue that it would not be 
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unusual,3 and briefly quibble that it is not 
semantically an “immunity,” because plaintiffs 
would still have the satisfaction of filing complaints 
before the courts summarily dismiss them all. NCAA 
Br. 30–31. But Petitioners claim that “amateurism 
rules are procompetitive as a matter of law,” id. at 
18, and that dismissal is required “on the pleadings” 
as to any rule the NCAA calls “amateurism,” id. at 
25, a categorization that is “not subject to judicial 
second-guessing.” Conf. Br. 3; see also NCAA Br. 43 
(courts are “required” to recognize “that the NCAA’s 
conception of amateurism is procompetitive”). They 
imagine a rule that would render some changing and 
uncertain class of conduct categorically beyond 
antitrust oversight. 
If there is consensus in antitrust about any single 
issue, it is that exemptions, immunities, and other 
scope limitations are rarely justified. “Language 
more comprehensive” than the antitrust statutes “is 
difficult to conceive.” United States v. South-Eastern 
Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944). That 
language captures Congress’s aim “to strike as 
broadly as it could.” Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 
 
3 Petitioners imply different and inconsistent justifications for 
their rule, and sometimes seem to acknowledge that it would 
be special. Sometimes they emphasize the NCAA’s 
uniqueness—they dwell on its special history and claim that 
college sports are non-commercial, educational, and social. 
Brief for Petitioner NCAA [NCAA Br.] 5–8, 31–33; Brief for 
Petitioner Conferences [Conf. Br.] 4–5. But other times, they 
claim their rule already applies in all business sectors. E.g., 
Conf. Br. 26 (“Board of Regents did not state a special rule for 
the NCAA; it applied broad and generally applicable standards 




U.S. 773, 787 (1975). More than a century of this 
Court’s precedent has established that “[r]epeals of 
[antitrust] by implication … are strongly disfavored” 
because “antitrust … [is] a fundamental national 
economic policy ….” Carnation Co. v. Pac. 
Westbound Conf., 383 U.S. 213, 217–18 (1966). Even 
where Congress makes exemptions, this Court reads 
them narrowly. E.g., Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. 
Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 126 (1982). These fundamental 
tenets are shared by other antitrust institutions. 
Every official study panel set up over many decades, 
by Republican and Democratic Presidents and by 
Congress, has called for the repeal or restriction of 
antitrust scope limits.4 And the enforcement 
agencies, under control of either party, have agreed,5 
as has the leading professional organization. See 
Am. Bar Ass’n, Section of Antitrust Law, Federal 
Statutory Exemptions From Antitrust Law 291–315 
(2007). 
 
4 Antitrust Modernization Comm’n, Rep. and 
Recommendations 336–38 (2007); 1 Nat’l Comm’n for the 
Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures, Rep. to the President 
and the Att’y Gen. 177–316 (1979); Rep. of the Task Force on 
Productivity and Competition, reprinted in 115 Cong. Rec. 
15933, 15934, 15937 (June 16, 1969); Rep. of the White House 
Task Force on Antitrust Policy, reprinted in 115 Cong. Rec. 
13890, 13897 (May 27, 1969); Rep. of the Att’y Gen.’s Comm. to 
Study the Antitrust Laws 269 (1955). 
5 E.g., Makan Delrahim, Asst. Att’y Gen., Examining 
Exemptions and Immunities from the Antitrust Laws, Remarks 
as Prepared for Antitrust Division’s First Competition and 
Deregulation Roundtable (March 14, 2018); Christine A. 
Varney, Asst. Att’y Gen., Antitrust Immunities, Remarks as 
Prepared for the American Antitrust Institute’s 11th Annual 
Conference (June 24, 2010). 
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B. Private Entities Do Not Get to Choose 
Their Own Non-Competition 
Antitrust Values 
Petitioners’ rule also would allow the NCAA to 
preserve values it considers important and use them 
to justify trade restraints that would be illegal if 
used by any other entity. Their “amateurism” 
concept still has no determinate content,6 and they 
don’t often explain which values it contains or if 
there are any limits on them. But Petitioners clearly 
believe that the NCAA may promote objectives 
based on morality, nostalgia, or other social policy 
concerns, and sometimes they admit it explicitly—as 
when they claim the NCAA enjoys antitrust 
deference because it “serv[es] a societally important 
non-commercial objective.” NCAA Br. 3. In fact, 
Petitioners seek to save those values from 
competition itself. Their major stated concern is that, 
without horizontal restraints, competition among 
schools for athletic talent would jeopardize values 
they prefer but markets do not. 
Antitrust entirely precludes these arguments. 
Congress has already chosen the values that are 
relevant to antitrust cases, and they are few, 
 
6 All the courts in O’Bannon and this case so found, despite the 
NCAA’s opportunity to explain the concept in two full trials 
and two appeals. The district court in O’Bannon found the 
definition “malleable,” lacking any “single definition,” and 
frequently “revised[,] … sometimes in significant and 
contradictory ways.” O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 
1000 (N.D. Cal. 2014). And the district court here found it 
lacking “coherent definition,” “circular,” and without any 
consistency except that “the NCAA has decided to forbid 
[something].” Pet. App. 83a, 92a, 142a. 
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narrowly delineated, and well known. If conduct 
subject to antitrust law impedes quality-adjusted 
price competition, then the only evidence that can 
mitigate its illegality is an improvement in price, 
quality, or output—as measured by an increase in 
consumer demand. It is no defense that a restraint 
serves some other social value or protects society 
from ruinous competition. E.g., FTC v. Super. Ct. 
Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 421–22 (1990); 
FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 463 
(1986); Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 
435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978); United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 222 (1940). Board of 
Regents itself rejected such an argument. The NCAA 
could not limit broadcast games to protect live 
attendance on the “assumption that the product 
itself is insufficiently attractive to consumers” 
because that argument would be “inconsistent with 
the basic policy of the Sherman Act.” 468 U.S. at 117; 
see also id. at 101 n.23 (“good motives will not 
validate an otherwise anticompetitive practice”). 
Longstanding precedent of this Court thus 
makes clear that “amateurism” is not a relevant 
legal category, and it has no independent 
significance in an antitrust case. It matters only to 
the extent that it improves price, quality, or output. 
As Chief Judge Thomas explained in his 
O’Bannon concurrence, “amateurism is relevant 
only insofar as popular demand for college sports is 
increased by consumer perceptions of and desire for 
amateurism.” O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 
1082 (9th Cir. 2015) (Thomas, C.J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original). 
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And the district court in this case appropriately 
explained that the restraints “cannot be deemed 
procompetitive simply because they promote or are 
consistent with amateurism,” but instead “must 
have some procompetitive effect on the relevant 
market.” Pet. App. 141a. 
C. Markets, Not Committees of 
Competitors, Decide Which Products 
Succeed 
As a corollary, Petitioners raise no legally 
relevant defense when they imply that particular 
products have a moral or intrinsic right to exist in 
their makers’ preferred form. On the one hand, firms 
are free to sell whatever they like and design their 
products as they think best, and in appropriate cases 
they may design them collectively. But their 
products must then succeed or fail on their merits, 
by appealing to consumers in terms of price or 
quality. No producer or association could argue that 
it needs a trade restraint to preserve its product 
because consumers in unrestrained markets would 
have chosen something else. 
For example, a given university might try to 
compete for athletic talent by increasing 
compensation. A rule prohibiting that competition 
might be justified if the evidence showed that the 
quality of the product, as measured by consumer 
demand, would be harmed by loss of team parity or 
consumer perception that such players are no longer 
“students” or the like. In fact, the courts below took 
that kind of evidence into account. But it is no 
defense to argue, as Petitioners do in various ways, 
that competition for talent should be suppressed 
11 
 
because member schools prefer their product to 
remain an “amateur” product, or that its “amateur” 
nature might not survive if competition for talent 
gives some schools better or more popular teams. 
Markets decide which products survive and, 
accordingly, how they will be designed. 
This same principle would apply to the 
“definition” of any product, in sports or elsewhere. 
Imagine that a group of manufacturers collectively 
agrees not to purchase foreign-made inputs, or that 
food distributors agree to discontinue products with 
high-fructose corn syrup. If the firms take action to 
enforce those decisions, and are shown to have 
harmed quality-adjusted price competition, they 
could not defend themselves by arguing that foreign 
inputs are “un-American” or that high-sugar foods 
are unhealthy. They could only argue that 
consumers value products with domestic inputs or 
healthier ingredients, as proven by evidence that 
they would buy them at higher prices or in larger 
quantities. Non-antitrust values might be important 
and widely shared, but they are not legally relevant 
until Congress adopts them by statute. 
D. No Other Economic Integration Is 
Treated as the NCAA Claims It Should 
Be Treated 
Petitioners’ proposed rule would give the NCAA 
more favorable treatment than the thousands of 
other economic integrations that face full Rule-of-
Reason scrutiny. For example, Petitioners rely on 
the famous Broadcast Music decision, NCAA Br. 19 
(citing Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 
Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 7 (1979)); Conf. Br. 28–29 (same), 
12 
 
but do not explain why the restraint there was 
subject to the full Rule of Reason, 441 U.S. at 24. 
That restraint made a stronger case for special 
protection because the product—a group license for 
musical compositions—literally could not exist 
without agreement. See id. at 20–22. The NCAA, by 
contrast, frequently changes its rules and tolerates 
inter-conference variation, and so proves by its own 
conduct that no particular restraints are required 
for the product to exist. 
The NCAA likewise deserves no better treatment 
than professional sports leagues, which are much 
more economically integrated. The NCAA 
coordinates hundreds of disparate institutions 
fielding thousands of teams in a variety of sports, 
most of which will never face one another on the 
field, and it permits extensive rules variations 
among the sub-national conferences and 
organizations. Professional leagues are more closely 
integrated, typically consisting of a small number of 
similar units subject to one set of rules and 
frequently interacting. And yet this Court has held 
professional leagues subject to ordinary Section 1 
treatment, even for conduct as to which their 
interests are aligned and collaboration could 
generate benefits. American Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 
U.S. 183, 203 (2010). 
Nor are amateur sports more important or 
special than the work of the economy’s thousands of 
technological standard-setting organizations, as to 
which full Rule of Reason is the norm. See Sean P. 
Gates, Standards, Innovation, and Antitrust: 
Integrating Innovation Concerns into the Analysis of 
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Collaborative Standard Setting, 47 Emory L.J. 583, 
627–30 (1998). Even though these entities’ sole 
reason for being is to define products, this Court has 
felt comfortable finding their conduct illegal without 
special rules or deference. See, e.g., Allied Tube & 
Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 
510–11 (1988); Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs, Inc. v. 
Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 577 (1982). And 
while the groups now enjoy some special protections 
in Section 1 cases, it is only because Congress 
provided them by statute. See National Cooperative 
Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, § 2, 98 
Stat. 1815, as amended, codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 4301–06. Likewise, Petitioners could not 
comfortably explain why amateur sports are more 
special or important than the large variety of 
important integrations that face full Rule-of-Reason 
analysis under the ancillary restraints rule.7 
E. Calling the NCAA a “Joint Venture” 
Adds Nothing to Petitioners’ 
Argument 
Petitioners do not strengthen their argument by 
asserting that the NCAA is a “joint venture” or that 
it cooperates in ways “required for a product to 
 
7 See, e.g., Freeman v. San Diego Ass'n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 
1133, 1151 (9th Cir. 2003); SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 
36 F.3d 958, 970 (10th Cir. 1994); Rothery Storage & Van Co. 
v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Polk 
Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 189 (7th 
Cir. 1985); see also Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. 
Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 338–39 (2d Cir. 2008) (Sotomayor, 
J., concurring); FTC & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust 




exist.” While courts have often been “bemused by the 
label ‘joint venture,’” Robert Pitofsky, Joint Ventures 
Under the Antitrust Laws: Some Reflections on the 
Significance of Penn-Olin, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1007, 
1045–46 (1969), this Court has frequently told them 
not to be. Recently, for example, this Court 
unanimously found a professional sports league to 
be subject to ordinary Rule-of-Reason treatment 
because “[t]he mere fact that [firms] operate jointly 
in some sense does not mean that they are immune.” 
American Needle, 560 U.S. at 199. After all, 
“[m]embers of any cartel could insist that their 
cooperation is necessary to produce the ‘cartel 
product’ and compete with other products.” Id. at 
199 n.7. Accordingly, “[a]n ongoing § 1 violation 
cannot evade § 1 scrutiny simply by giving the 
ongoing violation a name and label,” as “‘[p]erhaps 
every agreement and combination in restraint of 
trade could be so labeled.’” Id. at 197 (quoting 
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 
593, 598 (1951)). 
II. BOARD OF REGENTS CREATES NO 
SPECIAL RULE FAVORING THE NCAA 
Not only is the substance of Petitioners’ position 
contrary to the ordinary antitrust policy that applies 
in other sectors, but Petitioners gain no support 
from Board of Regents. That decision, which ruled 
against the NCAA, discussed amateurism only in 
dicta, and that discussion should be understood in 
its historical setting. Misleading excerpts from the 
ruling—or from lower court decisions—cannot fill 
the gaps in Petitioners’ argument. 
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A. Dicta and Context Reject Petitioners’ 
Radical Reinterpretation of Board of 
Regents 
Dicta. Board of Regents did not hold what 
Petitioners claim it did. Petitioners argue that that 
case “required” courts to recognize that “the NCAA’s 
conception of amateurism is procompetitive.” NCAA 
Br. 43 (emphasis added). They frequently reiterate 
Board of Regents’ dicta that amateur players “must 
not be paid,” see NCAA Br. 2, 3, 6, 11, 14, 16, 17, 22, 
27, 34, 35, 38, 45, 46; Conf. Br. 1, 5, 9, 16, 23, 31, 
even while acknowledging that they pay their 
players “modest” amounts, NCAA Br. 7, 27, 29, 37, 
46 n.4. And they say in various ways that this was a 
“holding.” Conf. Br. 23 (claiming that Board of 
Regents so “held”); see generally id. at 23–26; NCAA 
Br. 28–29 (contending that Board of Regents dicta 
“has full stare decisis effect”). 
As Board of Regents itself explained, however, 
this Court held “only that the record supports the 
District Court’s conclusion that by curtailing output 
and blunting the ability of member institutions to 
respond to consumer preference, the NCAA has 
restricted rather than enhanced the place of 
intercollegiate athletics in the Nation’s life.” 468 
U.S. at 120. That statement mentions neither 
amateurism nor evidentiary standards to be used in 
cases not before the Court. The brief discussion of 
amateurism, which Petitioners frequently cite, 
resolved no disputed matters of law and was subject 
to no fact findings in the trial record. See id. at 100–
01 (clarifying that no part of this Court’s “decision 
[was] based … on [its] respect for the NCAA’s 
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historic role in the preservation and encouragement 
of intercollegiate amateur athletics”). Remarkably, 
the NCAA did not even argue in Board of Regents 
that “amateurism” justified its restraints, and its 
counsel admitted during oral argument that it 
“might be able to get more viewers … if it had semi-
professional clubs rather than amateur clubs.” 
O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 999 (quoting Oral Arg. 
Tr. at 25, Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85). 
Context. The context of Board of Regents casts 
further doubt on Petitioners’ interpretation. 
Foreclosing judicial inquiry into uncertain facts 
would be quite at odds with the antitrust 
jurisprudence of the 1970s and 1980s. At that time, 
this Court was in the midst of a long season of repeal 
of per se antitrust rules, stressing the need for 
empirical caution. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. 
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49–59 (1977). 
In fact, the questions at issue in Board of Regents 
were poorly suited for conclusory, categorical 
treatment. For years, sports economists had been 
bitterly divided over empirical claims that trade 
restraints improve team parity or consumer appeal. 
Compare Brief of Economists as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondents, American Needle, 560 U.S. 
183, with Amicus Curiae Brief of Economists in 
Support of Petitioner, American Needle, 560 U.S. 
183. Since then, the empirical literature has grown 
against those claims.8 It would be uncanny for a 
 
8 See, e.g., Rodney Fort & Jason Winfree, 15 Sports Myths and 
Why They’re Wrong 7–110 (2013); Thomas A. Baker III, Marc 
Edelman, & Nicholas M. Watanabe, Debunking the NCAA’s 
Myth that Amateurism Conforms with Antitrust Law: A Legal 
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Court devoted to greater caution and empirical 
fullness to rule a priori on empirical matters that 
were sharply contested then and have grown more 
doubtful since. 
B. Petitioners’ Discussion of Board of 
Regents Is Misleading 
Petitioners exaggerate and misinterpret Board of 
Regents. First, they misstate what Board of Regents 
held as to the television broadcast restraints that 
were actually at issue, claiming they were “subject 
to detailed rule-of-reason analysis.” NCAA Br. 8, 23. 
Not only did Board of Regents not subject those 
restraints to the full Rule of Reason, but its holding 
that they enjoyed little deference at all is a leading 
application of the pro-plaintiff quick-look Rule of 
Reason. We know it was a quick-look case because 
the Court explicitly held that the television contract 
could be found illegal without any proof of market 
power. 468 U.S. at 109–10; see also Cal. Dental Ass’n 
v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769–70 (1999) (describing 
application of quick look in Board of Regents as what 
this Court “held”). 
This misreading seems important to Petitioners’ 
position. They imply that if the NCAA enjoys full-
Rule-of-Reason treatment for even the grossest 
horizontal price and output restraints, then perhaps 
rules like the scholarship restraints in this case 
enjoy more deferential treatment. But on the 
 
and Statistical Analysis, 85 Tenn. L. Rev. 661, 698 (2018) 
(empirical study found “no change in consumption of [D1 
Football Bowl Subdivision] Power Five football games 
following the first significant increase in student-athlete 
compensation in more than forty-two years”). 
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contrary, the NCAA’s restraints in Board of Regents 
were held nearly per se illegal because they were so 
obviously harmful. 
Similarly, in a revealing moment, Petitioners 
conceal an important distinction that the Court was 
at pains to explain and that the Board of Regents 
dicta was about. Petitioners quote from Board of 
Regents that “the NCAA and its member institutions 
market … competition itself” and that “this would be 
completely ineffective if there were no rules on 
which the competitors agreed to create and define 
the competition to be marketed.” NCAA Br. 22 
(quoting 468 U.S. at 101). But they then make a 
misleading edit, quoting this Court that “[a] myriad 
of rules … all must be agreed upon.” Id. (ellipses in 
Petitioner’s Brief). The Court actually wrote that the 
“myriad” includes “rules affecting such matters as 
the size of the field, the number of players on a team, 
and the extent to which physical violence is to be 
encouraged or proscribed.” Board of Regents, 468 
U.S. at 101 (emphasis added). Those restraints—
rules of on-field play on which schools must agree—
are far different than the price restrictions at issue 
in this case. See, e.g., American Needle, 560 U.S. at 
196–97 (stating that “contracts with … playing 
personnel” are an issue on which NFL teams 
“compete with one another”). 
C. The Lower Court “Consensus” 
Explicitly Rejects Petitioners’ 
Position 
The “consensus” of courts that Petitioners claim 
has read Board of Regents differently, NCAA Br. 9, 
is, at most, just one case. Petitioners’ other cited 
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cases are inapposite, and one of the key decisions on 
which they rely tells us that they are not on point. 
In fact—remarkably—that decision drew exactly the 
same distinction between procompetitive and 
anticompetitive restraints that the lower courts did 
in this case. 
Namely, Agnew v. NCAA, a case the NCAA won 
only because the plaintiff pled no relevant market at 
all, distinguished between NCAA rules governing 
“financial aid” and a category it described as 
“eligibility rules.” 683 F.3d 328, 345–47 (7th Cir. 
2012). The court borrowed from Board of Regents to 
make that distinction, id. at 339 (quoting 468 U.S. 
at 117), and to illustrate “eligibility,” it offered the 
example of “rules requiring class attendance,” id. at 
343. “[F]inancial aid rules,” on the other hand, 
including the scholarship limits in that case, 
deserved no “procompetitive presumption.” Id. at 
344. The court thought any such claim would be “far 
too great a leap to make without evidentiary proof at 
the full Rule of Reason stage.” Id. In other words, 
Agnew thought “eligibility” rules are those that 
require players actually to be students, and it 
explicitly distinguished those rules from education-
related compensation. That is the same distinction 
drawn by the courts below. 
Deppe v. NCAA, 893 F.3d 498 (7th Cir. 2018), just 
confirmed the state of Seventh Circuit law, relying 
mainly on Agnew to hold that a residency 
requirement—involving no price or output restraint, 
and merely ensuring a person is a student at the 
school where they want to play—is an “eligibility” 
rule that enjoys favorable treatment. Id. at 502. 
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Thus, the Seventh Circuit has all but explicitly held 
that NCAA limits on education-related payments 
must face full Rule-of-Reason review. The law of the 
Seventh and Ninth Circuits is the same. 
Petitioners cite two other inapt cases. Smith v. 
NCAA involved a non-monetary eligibility rule very 
similar to that in Deppe. 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998). 
Likewise, in upholding tire specifications chosen to 
make car races more exciting—the equivalent of 
specifications for football players’ shoes or helmets—
Race Tires America, Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire 
Corp. involved no horizontal restraints at all, much 
less horizontal price restraints. 614 F.3d 57 (3d Cir. 
2010).  
That leaves only McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 
1338 (5th Cir. 1988), which dismissed a challenge to 
financial benefits restrictions. But even that case did 
not find categorical immunity of the kind Petitioners 
claim, as it considered whether the plaintiff 
adequately alleged that the restraints would “stifle 
competition.” Id. at 1345. To whatever extent 
McCormack found a special rule in Board of Regents 
for price and output restraints, it is wrong, and it is 
alone. It would conflict with both the Seventh and 
Ninth Circuits, and is incorrect for the reasons amici 
have explained.  
III. THE COURTS BELOW FOUND A 
HORNBOOK VIOLATION OF ANTITRUST 
LAW 
The district court in this case, affirmed by the 
Ninth Circuit, applied hornbook antitrust law. The 
courts’ version of the Rule of Reason was deferential 
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to defendants, and the courts worked to help the 
defendants make their case by filling in weaknesses 
in the NCAA’s evidence. The courts found “severe” 
injury at the first stage of the analysis, a finding that 
remains undisputed, offset only modestly by 
procompetitive benefits that the lower courts found 
within the NCAA’s non-antitrust justifications. 
Given a finding of substantial net injury, the 
conclusion that the limited benefits could have been 
obtained without so much competitive damage 
naturally followed. 
Petitioners now respond with abstract logical 
critiques of the district court’s handling of Rule-of-
Reason steps two and three. Their arguments are 
incorrect, especially given the very high bar the 
courts required plaintiffs to meet at the third stage. 
In any event, they find no support in the caselaw, 
and even if they were correct, there would have 
followed a balancing stage at which the defendants 
likely would have lost. 
A. Plaintiffs Demonstrated “Severe” 
Anticompetitive Effects 
The plaintiffs in this case demonstrated a 
particularly strong case under the Rule of Reason. 
Of the 897 Rule-of-Reason cases decided in the 
modern era, courts have disposed of nearly all at the 
initial stage on the grounds that the plaintiff failed 
to demonstrate a significant anticompetitive effect.9 
 
9 Since 1977, courts decided 90% (809 of 897) on this ground, 
with the figure rising to 97% (391 of 402) after 1999. Michael 
A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 
21st Century, 16 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 827 (2009) (reviewing 
cases between 1999 and 2009); Michael A. Carrier, The Real 
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This case was very different. The plaintiffs 
demonstrated “severe” anticompetitive effects in the 
form of an “exercise [of] monopsony power” that 
“essentially eliminate[d] price competition ….” Pet. 
App. 139a, 162a. Because “elite student-athletes 
lack any viable alternatives to [Division 1],” they 
must “accept … whatever compensation is offered to 
them,” regardless of “whether any such 
compensation is an accurate reflection of the 
competitive value of their athletic services.” Pet. 
App. 34a; see also Pet. App. 78a (noting harm from 
“artificially compressing and capping student-
athlete compensation and reducing competition for 
student-athlete recruits by limiting the 
compensation offered in exchange for their athletic 
services”). 
Nor are these severe harms to the players 
hypothetical. As Judge Milan Smith noted in his 
concurrence below, “Student-Athletes work an 
average of 35–40 hours per week on athletic duties 
during their months-long athletic seasons,” are 
“often forced to miss class, to neglect their studies, 
and to forego courses,” and are “often prevented from 
obtaining internships or part-time paying jobs,” 
while “the NCAA and Division 1 universities make 
billions of dollars from ticket sales, television 
contracts, merchandise, and other fruits that 
directly flow from the labors of Student-Athletes.” 
Pet. App. 53a–54a (Smith, J., concurring) (emphasis 
in original); see also Tony Paul, UM’s Fab Five 
 
Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 
1265 (reviewing cases from Continental T.V., 433 U.S. 36 
(1977) to 1999). The drafters reviewed every Rule-of-Reason 
case between 2009 and February 2021 for this brief. 
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Players Want to Break Down Barriers, The Detroit 
News, Oct. 8, 2016 (at the same time Michigan 
signed a deal with Nike in the early 1990s worth 
$170 million, members of the “Fab Five” basketball 
team had to pool their money so they could afford 
Taco Bell). 
B. The Courts Below Gave the NCAA the 
Benefit of the Doubt on Its Purported 
Procompetitive Justifications 
After the plaintiffs’ demonstration at stage one, 
the burden shifted to the defendant to demonstrate 
a procompetitive justification. The NCAA, however, 
offered little related to any antitrust justification, 
instead relying on its own definition of 
“amateurism.” Petitioners complain that the courts 
below didn’t understand or didn’t apply that 
definition properly—even though the district court 
applied the same definition as the NCAA’s own 
expert, Pet. App. 40a n.16—but it doesn’t matter. 
When called to provide legally relevant evidence, the 
defendants “offered no cogent explanation for why 
limits or prohibitions on these education-related 
benefits are necessary to preserve consumer 
demand,” Pet. App. 148a, and their expert “did not 
even attempt to examine whether a relationship 
exists between [athlete] compensation and 
consumer demand,” Pet. App. 144a. In affirming 
those findings, the Ninth Circuit noted that “the 
NCAA set limits on education-related benefits 
without consulting any demand studies.” Pet. App. 
36a. 
By contrast, the district court relied on legally 
relevant evidence. It considered “demand analyses, 
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survey evidence, and NCAA testimony indicating 
that caps on non-cash, education-related benefits 
have no demand-preserving effect and, therefore, 
lack a procompetitive justification.” Pet. App. 36a. It 
reviewed defendants’ evidence carefully, searching 
for legally relevant benefits and finding that “some 
of the challenged rules serve [the NCAA’s] 
procompetitive purpose: limits on above-COA [cost-
of-attendance] payments unrelated to education, the 
COA cap on athletic scholarships, and certain 
restrictions on cash academic or graduation awards 
and incentives.” Pet. App. 35a (emphasis omitted). 
The court found no benefit in “restricting ‘non-cash 
education-related benefits,’” however, because those 
“benefits, like a scholarship for post-eligibility 
graduate school tuition, [are] inherently limited to 
[their] actual value, and could not be confused with 
a professional athlete’s salary.” Pet. App. 35a. The 
Ninth Circuit affirmed this distinction, holding that 
the district court “fairly found that NCAA 
compensation limits preserve demand to the extent 
they prevent unlimited cash payments akin to 
professional salaries, but not insofar as they restrict 
certain education-related benefits.” Pet. App. 40a. 
C. Petitioners’ Attacks on Steps Two and 
Three Are Incorrect and Would Make 
No Difference 
Considering Harms and Benefits “As a Whole.” 
Petitioners contend that the NCAA’s evidence of 
procompetitive benefits would have been better 
received if the district court had “review[ed] at step 
2 whether [the] rules as a whole produced the 
procompetitive benefits of offering a distinctive 
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product,” implying that it was unfair to have 
considered the harms of “the NCAA rules as a whole 
…..” NCAA Br. 39 (emphasis and quotations 
omitted); see Conf. Br. 35. They argue that doing so 
had the effect of converting a “less” restrictive 
alternative test into a “least” restrictive one. NCAA 
Br. 41; Conf. Br. 37 (“the effect of the lower courts’ 
approach was to impose upon them the insuperable 
burden of having to prove a negative: the absence of 
a less restrictive alternative”) (emphasis in original). 
Apparently as a variation on the same argument, 
Petitioners claim that they effectively bore the 
burden at stage three. Conf. Br. 39. They then 
contend that the district court would have avoided 
these problems by following a “reasonable necessity” 
test instead of one based on less restrictive 
alternatives. NCAA Br. 41–42; Conf. Br. 40. 
Petitioners’ argument finds no support in the 
caselaw and misapprehends the burden-shifting 
Rule of Reason. The argument is irrelevant at stage 
two, where courts do not inquire into the size or 
nature of the benefits shown, or compare them to the 
harm. At stage two, courts merely ask whether 
defendants have produced some indication of 
benefits to competition. If so, the burden shifts back 
to the plaintiff. Likewise, the purpose of stage three 
is not to compare the benefits to demonstrated harm, 
but only to ask whether they could be obtained with 
much less harm. 
Petitioners argue that stage three subjected 
them to a “least” restrictive alternative analysis 
because the courts below didn’t group their 
justifications together. But the courts could not and 
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should not have lumped Petitioners’ claims into one 
justification. Whether or not the courts considered 
the harms separately or as a whole makes no 
difference because they found that each restraint 
has “severe” anticompetitive effects. Each of them 
“artificially compress[es] and cap[s] student-athlete 
compensation.” Pet. App. 78a, 82a. And each 
prevents the compensation from “accurate[ly] 
reflect[ing] … the competitive value of … athletic 
services.” Pet. App. 82a. 
In contrast, some of Petitioners’ justifications 
were supported by no evidence of consumer benefit 
at all, as they failed to show a connection between 
particular restraints and consumer demand. 
Petitioners seem to argue that the courts were 
required to credit those alleged benefits as part of a 
package because the harms were considered 
together. But if some proffered justifications are 
legally irrelevant, then courts should not be 
compelled to accept them.10 
Nor can Petitioners find support in the caselaw 
for their argument. Having reviewed all 897 Rule-of-
Reason cases in the modern era, we were unable to 
locate a single one in which a court examined the 
 
10 Petitioners also misread the leading treatise on this point. 
The discussion there of “the content of the restraint,” which 
includes “the sum total of everything that the parties have 
‘agreed’ about,” refers not to multiple rules but to the 
“enlarge[ment] or interpret[ation of] those documents by [the 
defendant’s] conduct.” 7 Philip E. Areeda & Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles 
and Their Application ¶ 1504d, p. 421 (4th ed. 2017) (“Areeda 
& Hovenkamp”) (italics omitted). 
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defendant’s array of justifications in a bundle 
similar to what the NCAA is seeking. 
Importance of third stage. Having found severe 
anticompetitive harm and (as reformulated in terms 
of consumer demand) some benefit, the district court 
moved to step three. This stage of the analysis is 
important: If a less restrictive alternative would 
attain the defendant’s objectives nearly—or 
completely—as effectively while harming 
competition significantly less, then we can achieve 
the defendant’s objectives with less competitive 
harm. Moreover, where a plaintiff demonstrates 
that the benefits did not require such significant 
competitive harms, courts can avoid the challenge of 
balancing harms and benefits. Areeda & 
Hovenkamp ¶ 1507d, p. 450. The third stage also 
avoids the “extreme” position of “tolerat[ing] every 
restraint whenever the defendant states a plausible 
connection with a legitimate objective and claims 
that the alternatives are unsatisfactory.” Id. 
¶ 1505b, p. 436. 
Highest bar for less restrictive alternatives. The 
lower courts’ approach at this third stage was not 
only appropriate, but also highly favorable to 
Petitioners. First, the courts below, relying on 
O’Bannon, applied the most demanding version of 
the analysis that courts have applied in the past four 
decades. It credited only alternatives when the 
restraint was “patently and inexplicably stricter 
than … necessary” and the alternative did not 
impose “‘significantly increased cost.’” Pet. App. 41a 
(quoting O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1074–75 (emphasis 
omitted)). This is an extremely high bar that 
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requires a plaintiff to show that a restraint is clearly 
and without explanation more restrictive than 
needed. Such an analysis would only credit an 
alternative when the restraint is obviously 
disconnected from the defendant’s justifications. 
Because it is so difficult to satisfy, it avoids judicial 
“tinker[ing]” to find marginally less restrictive 
alternatives, and in fact closely resembles the 
“reasonable necessity” standard that Petitioners 
prefer. See NCAA Br. 41; Conf. Br. 47, 49. A 
restraint that is clearly and inexplicably 
disconnected from the objective is not reasonably 
necessary to attain it. See Carrier, Real Rule of 
Reason, 1999 B.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1341–46. 
Second, the courts connected the alternative with 
the defendant’s objectives. A concern at the third 
stage is that courts might focus only on the existence 
of less restrictive alternatives, not on whether the 
alternative attains the defendant’s objectives. That 
did not happen here. Again, the courts worked to 
shape the NCAA’s focus on amateurism into a 
justification cognizable under the antitrust laws. 
This significant effort to rework the NCAA’s 
justifications made it much more likely that the 
courts would—as they in fact did—consider whether 
the proffered alternatives would attain the goal of 
consumer demand, ensuring that they directly 
considered the link between alternatives and 
objectives. 
Courts’ applications of less restrictive 
alternatives. The district court accepted an 
alternative that would  
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“(1) allow the NCAA to continue to limit 
grants-in-aid at not less than the 
[COA]; (2) allow the [NCAA] to 
continue to limit compensation and 
benefits unrelated to education; [and] 
(3) enjoin NCAA limits on most 
compensation and benefits that are 
related to education, but allow it to 
limit education-related academic or 
graduation awards and incentives, as 
long as the limits are not lower than its 
limits on athletic performance awards 
now or in the future.” Pet. App. 118a. 
This result is appropriate. It gives the NCAA the 
benefit of the doubt when there is any chance that 
the restrictions could possibly affect consumer 
demand. And it precisely matches the 
procompetitive justifications the courts accepted. 
On the other hand, the district court “reasonably 
concluded that uncapping certain education-related 
benefits would preserve consumer demand for 
college athletics just as well as the challenged rules 
do.” Pet. App. 41a. It is difficult to see how 
restrictions on education-related benefits like 
computers, science equipment, musical instruments, 
and tutoring make it more likely that consumers 
would watch college sports. In fact, if the NCAA 
actually sought to foster consumer demand, then 
“market competition in connection with education-
related benefits” would itself “reinforce consumers’ 
perception of student-athletes as students.” Pet. 
App. 43a. Restrictions like these do not make 
student-athletes appear less like professionals or 
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enhance consumer demand, and are more likely 
explained as a cartel’s cost-saving measure, which 
courts do not accept. Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶ 1508, 
p. 461. 
D. Even in the Absence of a Less 
Restrictive Alternative, Plaintiffs 
Would Have Won at Balancing 
In any event, none of Petitioners’ attacks on the 
second- and third-stage analyses are ultimately 
relevant because even if plaintiffs had not shown a 
less restrictive alternative, this case would have 
gone to balancing. And at that stage, given “severe” 
anticompetitive effects and the NCAA’s failure to 
consider effects on consumer demand, defendants 
likely would have lost. 
All the sources relied on for this Court’s recent 
formulation of the Rule-of-Reason test in Ohio v. 
American Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018), 
required a balancing stage,11 and the dissent in that 
case plainly contemplated one. See id. at 2291 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that the plaintiff 
could win at the third stage “by showing that the 
legitimate objective does not outweigh the harm that 
competition will suffer, i.e., that the agreement ‘on 
 
11 See Michael A. Carrier, The Four-Step Rule of Reason, 33 
Antitrust 50, 53 (2019) (analyzing Capital Imaging Assocs. v. 
Mohawk Valley Medical Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 
1993); 1 J. von Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws and Trade 
Regulation § 12.02[1] (2d ed. 2017); and most notably Areeda 
& Hovenkamp ¶ 1502, pp. 398–99 (explaining that if a plaintiff 
cannot show a less restrictive alternative, “the harms and 
benefits must be compared to reach a net judgment whether 
the challenged behavior is, on balance, reasonable”)). 
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balance’ remains unreasonable”). The leading 
treatise also contemplates balancing because, even 
if it is sometimes difficult or problematic, some 
opportunity for balancing is essential. Areeda & 
Hovenkamp ¶ 1507a, p. 442; see also, e.g., Pet. App. 
162a (“If no balancing were required at any point in 
the analysis, an egregious restraint with a minor 
procompetitive effect would have to be allowed to 
continue, merely because a qualifying less 
restrictive alternative was not shown.”); Carrier, 
The Four-Step Rule of Reason, 33 Antitrust at 53–
54. Other than conduct deemed per se illegal, 
antitrust doctrine requires courts to consider 
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects, and it is 
hard to see how a court can make this assessment 
without, at some point, having the chance to directly 
compare the two. In the context of this case, a 
balancing analysis likely would have led to the 




For the reasons above, this Court should affirm 
the decision of the court below. 
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